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In the Image of Man:
Reflections on Articificial Intelligence
Noreen Herzfeld

"Then God said: 'Let us make man in our image, after our likeness. Let them
have dominion over the fish of the sea, the birds of the air, and the cattle, and over
all the wild animals and all the creatures that crawl on the ground.' God created man
in his image; in the divine image he created him; male and female he created them."
(Genesis 1:26-27)
We have viewed ourselves as being created in the image of God. And this has
been important in defining our image of ourselves. In relation to God, we are the
creature, he the creator. However, we also view ourselves as creators; some have
interpreted the 'image of God' spoken of in Genesis 1 specifically to refer to the
ability we share with our creator to create.
And we have created. We have created art, literature, scientific theories, whole
civilizations. Much of what we create is in our own image. We see images of
ourselves in our art, be it literary or visual. We create verbal images of ourselves
in our philosophies and theologies. Yet what we create is generally in our image
only partially, often only superficially.
Man as creator is explored in the greek myth of Pygmalian, found in Ovid's
Metamorphoses. Briefly, Pygmalian was a young sculptor, handsome and sought
after by the local maidens, but unenticed by any of them. According to Ovid,
Pygmalian was shocked at the vices of human women or, at least, at their
imperfections. So he set about sculpting, creating the "perfect woman" out of ivory.
When he finished his magnum opus, he had the unfortunate fate of having been so
successful in his work that he found himself in love with his creation. He lavished
attention and affection on the unheeding statue. The story has a happy ending; the
gods take pity on Pygmalian and breathe life into his statue and they live together
happily ever after.
There are several interesting points about this story that I will be referring to
later. For now, it serves to illustrate the deficiency in most of our creations. They
lack life; they are like us only superficially. The character in a novel, the figure in
a painting, are limited to certain words, to one pose. They have neither minds nor
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wills of their own.
Enter the computer. The computer too is a creation in our image. And like our
other creations, the image is obviously partial. Computers don't look much like us.
But the computer is different in that the part of ourselves that it imitates is our mind.
And we identify with our minds. This can be seen in the very fact that we call
ourselves "homo sapiens." We are thinkers, and in our minds we fmd our identity.
So here we have a creation of a different order. In thinking about the computer,
particularly with respect to artificial intelligence, we seem to have created something that is truly like ourselves.
But are computers intelligent? "Artificial intelligence" is a commonly used term
in our society, but many people probably have little idea what it really means. To
many, it conjures up visions ofR2-D2 or Hal (from the movie 2001). I'd like to
begin by briefly summarizing what artificial intelliegence is and where it seems to
be going.
Artificial intelligence is a loosely defined collection of areas of research that
attempt to mimic some narrow area of human endeavor. These major areas are
natural language processing, pattern or visual recognition, game playing and expert
systems. I will briefly explain what each of these entails.
Natural language processing and pattern recognition are attempts to develop for
the computer the human attributes of aural and visual understanding; to allow
computers to hear and see and understand what it is they have heard or seen.
Successes in these areas have been limited. Computers perform in these areas by
attempting to match sounds or patterns to a given norm or template. Flexibility is
lacking. If we ask someone from Birmingham, Alabama and someone from
Bangor, Maine to pronounce the same sentence, we may get wildly varying results,
and the possibilities are close to endless. Now, we may not always be able to
understand various accents or regional variations ourselves, but we have a much
more flexible system for picking out recognizable elements and puzzling out the rest
than anyone has yet been able to program into a computer. Leaving aside the
difficulties of the spoken word, even our written language seems to have endless
possibilities. So much of the meaning of words is derived from their context that
it becomes virtually impossible to program a computer with all the possibilities.
Consider the sentences ''Time flies like an arrow." and "Fruit flies like an apple."
One cannot even pick out what is the subject and what is the verb without
understanding the context of the sentence. There have been attempts at writing
automatic translating programs. The results have been more humorous than
otherwise. For example, one program which attempted to take into account cultural
biases in translating between English and Russian translated the Biblical passage
"The spirit is willing but the flesh is weak" into "The vodka is good but the meat is
rotten!"
The area of visual recognition suffers from similar difficulties. Consider for
example, the task of recognizing a chair. There is no easy defmition for chair that
will take into account everything from straight-backed chairs, to beanbag chairs, to
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Bauhaus design. A purely functional defmition would have to include window
ledges, car seats, and toilets. The task is difficult. We use an incredible amount of
information simply to recognize a chair. Consider too the simple task of recognizing
a face - something every six month old child is reasonably good at The variety of
expressions can make simple pattern matching a terrific chore for the computer.
Features change in shape, size, and placement.
The computer has fared much better in the realms of game playing and expert
systems. (For those unfamiliar with this term, an expert system is a program that
attempts to answer questions or reason in an particular domain, as an expert does.)
These are relatively easy areas for the computer primarily because they deal with
extremely limited worlds. Game playing is a tailor-made situation for the computer
because each game takes place in the limited world of the board and the moves
allowed in the game, and these moves can be expressed using a finite list of rules.
Chess, for example, is limited to a sixty-four square world with only thirty-two
inhabitants, each with a very limited range of activities. These limitations allow the
computer to grasp nearly all possibilities and so we have programs with master
rankings. The real world, however, is infinitely more complex.
Expert systems involve similar limited worlds. There are expert systems, for
example, to diagnose disease or analyze chemical bonds. (The business world has
recently been pumping money into expert system research, hoping for one that will
analyze WallS treet!) As an example of a successful expert system, I will describe
MYCIN, a program developed by the medical school at Stanford to diagnose and
recommend treatment for blood infections and meningitis. The patient's symptoms
are entered into the computer and the computer can ask questions of the doctor to
gain relevant lab or other information . . MYCIN has been quite successful at
diagnosis on partial information. On average, it prescribed fewer drugs than a
comparative group of doctors, and successfully diagnosed 69% of its cases, as
compared to an average of 62% for the doctors. (Luger 324) But again, one should
note the extremely limited world that MYCIN is working in. This is not even the
world of the general practitioner. The expert system approach does not work for
general intelligence. The general information that informs our choices is too large
a database to enter into any present day computer.
Thus, when compared to human intelligence, we see obvious limitations to
computer intelligence. The source of these limitations lies in the difference between
how the computer functions and how the brain functions .. We don't know exactly
how the brain functions. We do know that the human brain contains over 10 billion
neurons, each capable of storing more data than a single bit or circuit in the
computer. Still, supercomputers are beginning to approach this memory capacity.
Furthermore, the brain's .neurons are fairly slow when compared to computer
circuits; the brain processes data in milliseconds as opposed to nanoseconds. So far,
things look pretty good for the computer. What gives the brain its advantage is the
fact that the neurons in the brain are connected to each other in an incredibly
complicated network and the brain is theoretically capable of processing informa15

lion in every neuron at the same time. The computer, on the other hand, processes
only one piece of information at a time in a step-by-step fashion. Thus, though it
can process any given piece of information faster than the brain, it is much slower
at complex or multifaceted tasks. The faster processing speed of the computer
shows up on problems that necessitate a step-by-step solution; your calculator can
do arithmetic calculations faster than your brain. But problems that involve
searching massive databases, making connections between several pieces of
information, or leaps of intuition are done faster by the human brain.
Yet there has been progress. Computers have gotten faster and more efficient
every year. But today we are facing a limit, the speed of light. Past gains in speed
and efficiency have come primarily from making computer circuits smaller,
allowing computers to have more circuits and, therefore, larger memories and
reducing the distance the electrical current has to travel to turn circuits on and off
within the computer, making processing of information faster. The only other factor
that slows the computer down is the friction of the electrical current as it travels
through a circuit. Assuming new advances in superconductivity, friction will
become negligible. But we can only make circuits so small (they are already
microscopic) and then we will be limited by the speed of electricity, the speed of
light. Superconductivity may give us a fourth generation of slightly more powerful
computers than we currently have. After that, the only way to make computers
much more efficient is to mimic the parallel structure of the brain.
Computer scientists are working on models called neural networks to do just
that. However, there are problems. Current models have been quite small (on a scale
of 100-200 processors) and performance declines exponentially as the number of
processors increases. Currently, no one has any idea how to handle billions of
processors simultaneously. The number and nature of the connections quickly
exceeds the conceptual grasp of our conscious minds. Moreover, we don't know
enough about how the mind works to get a good model. The question arises whether
the human brain can ever fully comprehend its own workings. Can we understand
mind with mind? As mathematicians and philosophers know, self-referential
problems are fraught with difficulties and paradoxes. Currently, we seem to be
bound by the fact that our conscious minds work in a step-by-step fashion and we
project this method onto the computer. (For a complete discussion on neural
networks, see Folsom.)
We are left with the fact that we are unlikely to make any real strides in artificial
intelligence unless we manage to change the structure of the computer itself, and
find a way to master massively parallel structures. Until then, the world will simply
be too large and complex a thing to be comprehended in a step-by-step manner.
It is generally agreed that we would have a truly intelligent machine if it could
pass a test devised by Alan Turing. This test is a version of the old TV game "To
Tell the Truth." A man would be placed in one room and a computer in another. One
could question both of them and would be asked to tell which was the computer and
which the man. True artificial intelligence would imply that one would not be able
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to tell the difference. We are a long way from producing a machine that would not
fail this test very quickly. The debate has been raging for years as to whether we
will ever produce such a machine. Rather than enter into this fray, I would ask a
different question: not "Can we produce such a machine?" but "Why would we
want to?" Why do we want to create artificial intelligence?
This question has not been addressed seriously, to my knowledge, in any of the
literature. I have the feeling that most computer scientists would find the answer
self-evident "Why not?" But the question cannot be so easily dismissed. Mter all,
we're not talking about an isolated Dr. Frankenstein working away in the basement.
The search for artificial intelligence is a multi-million dollar effort involving both
the business and university reSearch communities, not to mention the Pentagon. It
would seem that a scrutiny of our motives is not out of order.
Perhaps the most obvious answer to the question of "why?" is that we look to
the computer for convenience or power. We have always designed machines to do
our work for us. Why not one to do our thinking for us also? This reason seems very
plausible on first glance. We want computers to analyze everything from Wall
Street to battle situations. We would like robots that can see and hear and bring us
the morning coffee without bumping into every chair in the room. We'd like to sit
back while our mechanical servants do the work, and gain for us power or wealth.
But carry this to its logical conclusion and we end up with Hal, a computer that
is quite ready and willing to do our thinking for us. This is the stuff of science fiction
nightmares. Norbert Wiener, in his last collection ofessays, pointed out the problem
with our desire for a machine to do our thinking for us. He likens this desire to our
perpetual fascination with sorcery. We want to believe in the possibility of a Golem
or a Genie; we want a servant to give us power by some means other than our own
hard work. And to many people, the computer seems to give us this magical power.
Magic goes on inside that little white box and answers come out that we didn't have
to think up ourselves. But the folk literature of the ages warns us of the follies of
relying on magical power.
Wiener uses one of the best stories of this genre to make his point, the story of
the Monkey's Paw. Briefly, a family is sitting around the fire on a windy rain-fllled
night listening to the stories of a captain recently returned from India. At one point
the son gets up to leave for the night shift at a local factory. The discussion among
the others turns to native magic and the captain shows them a withered old monkey's
paw, saying that it was endowed by a Hindu holy man with the power of granting
three wishes to three successive owners. He says he does not know the first two
wishes of the first owner, but that the third one was for death. He himself was the
second owner, but his experiences were too horrible to relate. With that, he casts
the paw into the fire. The host, of course, grabs the paw {)Ut of the frre and wishes
for 200. There is a knock at the door. A somber foreman from the factory is there
to inform the family that their son has been killed in an accident at the factory, and,
although the factory owners themselves were in no ways to blame, they would like
to offer the family 200 in remuneration and condolence (Wiener 59).
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The family continues to make wishes that only make matters worse, but we can
stop here. The moral is clear. Computers are as literal as the monkey's paw and
though we might like them to think for us, chances are that we may not get what we
asked for or, rather, we may get exactly what we asked for. Perhaps we had better
to do our thinking ourselves. Clearly, some of us (including folks in the Pentagon)
still want artificial intelligence for reasons of power or convenience, regardless of
the dangers. But, admitting the dangers, as well as the moral shallowness of this
reason, there are others who still continue to have an interest in artificial intelligence. They must have other reasons.
A second reason we may want artificial intelligence is simple curiosity. This is
the "what can be done will be done" answer. By itself, this answer too seems
insufficient No one is spending millions of dollars trying to develop a non-prickly
porcupine, yet it might be do-able. Lots of things could be done but aren't bothered
with. Of course, the curiosity about artificial intelligence may be stronger than that
for non-prickly porcupines; after all, artificial intelligence might tell us something
about ourselves, a topic we are perennially interested in. Unfortunately, this has not
proven to be the case. Artificial intelligence research has told us relatively little
about the way we think. Rather, only by borrowing from the psychologists, have
we learned a little about how to design artificial intelligence. Indeed, there is a
danger in interpolating in the other direction. We might miss possibilities in
ourselves by limiting our perception of our thought processes to what a computer
is capable of doing. This limiting already can be seen when we consider data that
can be quantified as more pertinent, more "scientific", simply because it can be
entered into a computer.
Having summarily dismissed power, convenience, curiosity, and self-understanding as insufficient motives by themselves to drive us in our search for artificial
intelligence, what is left? Let us return to the Pygmalian myth for a clue to another
possibility. Why did Pygmalian carve his perfect woman? Why a woman? Why
indeed did God create humankind in the first place? Why this drive to create in one's
own image? I think one answer lies in our intrinsic loneliness. As Henri Nouwen
points out, "loneliness is one of the most universal human experiences, [and] our
contemporary Western society has heightened.the awareness of our loneliness to an
unusual degree." (14) He also suggests that "too often we will do everything
possible to avoid the confrontation with the experience of being alone, and
sometimes we are able to create the most ingenious devices to prevent ourselves
from being reminded of this condition." (16)
I'm not suggesting that we want thinking computers merely as companions to
fill the moments when we find ourselves alone. The loneliness we seek to have
alleviated by artificial intelligence is much deeper and more fundamental. It is the
loneliness ofbeing the only rational creatures, a loneliness of the species rather than
of individuals.
Nobel prize winning biologist, Jacques Monod, touches on this loneliness in his
final work on evolution. As man begins to accept the theory of evolution, he must
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"wake to his total solitude, his fundamental isolation" in an uncaring universe. (172)
Science has reduced our dependence on the existence of other rational beings. We
no longer need God and the angels to explain the working of the universe. But how
lonely it is without them! Our necessity to create some other type of rational being
seems to be directly proportional to the waning of our faith in the previous existence
of other rational beings.
The realization of our isolation as rational creatures brings with it both
tremendous responsibility and tremendous anxiety. ·As Monod puts it, our destiny,
our duties are nowhere spelled out for us but are of our own making. This is a big
responsibility. We want to hold the power that being rational creatures gives us, but
we do not want to bear the reSponsibility of that power alone.
We want to share responsibility. On a small scale, this can already be seen quite
clearly in the use of computers in warfare. Joseph Weizenbaum of MIT has pointed
out that policy-makers have "abdicated their decision-making responsibility to a
technology that they do not understand-though all the while maintaining the
illusion that they, the policy makers, are formulating policy questions and answering them." At the height of the Vietnam war, Admiral Thomas Moorer, chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was quoted in the New York Times as stating that the
generals were "slaves to these damned computers," and that he could not help but
base his decisions on "what the computer says." And no human being is responsible
for what the computer says. (Weizenbaum 239) So many people contribute to the
design, construction, and especially the programming of a large computer system
that no particular person is ultimately responsible for the results.
There is one final point in the myth ofPygmalian that is illustrative. Pygmalian
created out of lonliness and then fell in love with his creation. Are we in danger of
doing this? Might we fall in love with the computer? Actually, some already have.
We call them "hackers." They are a phenomenon that can be observed in the
computer center on most large (and several small) campuses. Like a typical lover,
the hacker is nocturnal, living for the hours he can spend with his love. He lives only
for interaction with the computer and generally has very few human relationships.
(I use "he" deliberately-this seems to be an predominantly male phenomenon. I
have yet to meet a female hacker in this sense of the term, though I have known
several men that fit this description. For a complete description of the compulsive
programmer, see Weizenbaum, chapter 4.)
The hacker can be dismissed as a pathological case. On a larger level, one could
suggest that our whole society has a bit of a love affair with the computer. And in
so far as love blinds us to the shortcomings of the beloved, this could beadanger.On
the other hand, we all seem to be fairly glad to believe that our creator has fallen in
love with us; I would hope that if we somehow did manage to create intelligent
computers that we would treat them with compassion.
In conclusion, we seem to be driven to create an intelligent machine, in our own
image. This drive comes, at least in part, from our inner loneliness and our wish to
share responsibility for this planet and indeed, for ourselves. But there are inherent
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dangers in our present course. These dangers come, in part, from the initial premise
that what counts in our image is our ability to reason or think. But the image of God
reflected in humankind is not simply our ability to reason, nor our ability to create,
but our ability to love. And though we may love our creation in some way, we have
not even considered endowing computers with the ability to love. Pygmatian' s
statue only came alive when it gained the ability to return the love its creator lavished
on it. Whether we are capable of creating a machine with this ability remains to be
seen. In the meantime, we are still in the realm of the superficial.

20

Works Cited
Dreyfus, Hubert. What Computers Can't Do: The Limits of
Artificial Intelligence. New York: Harper and Row, 1972.
Folsom, Tyler. "The Search for an Electronic Brain: An
Introduction to Neural Networks." The CPSR Newsletter 7:1
(1989): 14-21.
Luger, George and William Stubblefield. Artificial Intelligence
and the Design ofExperi'Systems. Redwood City: Benjamin
Cummings, 1989.
McCorduck, Pamela. Machines Who Think. San Francisco: W .H.
Freeman, 1979.
Monod, Jacques. Chance and Necessity. New York: Random House,
1971.
Nouwen, Henri. Reaching Out: The Three Movements of the
Spiritual Life. Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1975.
Ovid. Metamorphoses. Trans. Rolfe Humphries. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1957.
Weizenbaum, Joseph. Computer Power and Human Reason. New York:
W.H. Freeman, 1976.
Wiener, Norbert. God and Golem, Inc .. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press,
1964.

21

